We conclude that impact of outside director on corporate performance is narrow in Japan.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Japanese companies have experienced the frequent occurrence of corporate scandal, (1) and there has been a great discussion about the strengthening of corporate governance in Japan. Generally, corporate governance is the system of rules, practices and processes by which a company is directed and controlled. The injection expansion to enhance production capacity by the practice of the growth strategy including the strengthening of corporate governance are indispensable because the population of Japan has declined rapidly.
Moreover, it is thought that the reinforcement of corporate governance can contribute to raise the potentiality of growth through the promotion of innovation and the activation of capital spending. Particularly, the aggressive utilization of outside directors' knowledge and experience that cultivated outside of a company is a part of " aggressive governance strategy " to improve medium-and-long term corporate value ( Reviving Japan Strategy " JAPAN is BACK " revised edition [2014] ).
However, actually, about the reinforcement of such governance, can it be affirmed at a point of economic rationality? Actually, does the reinforcement of corporate governance bring the improvement of corporate performance? Our research put it focus on the introduction of outside directors in corporate governance in particular. We survey prior researches on influence that the introduction of outside directors gives to corporate performance of Japanese companies and based on that, we perform a statistical verification whether the introduction of outside directors increases the profitability of Japanese companies. This time, we paid our attention to a timeseries feature of the profit of companies and let our model contain it as a variable. We inspected the relations between corporate governance and the profitability of companies by estimating the relations between corporate governance and the time-series features of profits of companies. It is the characteristic of our research. That is because few theory models to connect the fundamentals and the profitability of companies have been built, and as a result, we think that reliable regression models about the relation between corporate governance and the profitability of companies have not been seemed to be derived.
Prior researches' results are divided by the object and the method of empirical researches whether the introduction of outside directors affects corporate performance. Particularly, the need to divide companies into some groups by characteristics can be noticed. What we can conclude from our empirical research is the following. In this research, when we estimate the effects of corporate governance reinforcement with disregard to the profit situations of companies, the research did not provide meaningful results statistically. That is to say, we were not able to confirm positive effects of corporate governance reinforcement on profitability of companies. However, when companies are in critical situations (ROA <0), governance reinforcement got a result to have some positive effect for recovery of the profitability.
In the section 2 of our article, we place the introduction of outside directors in main company's governance reforms in Japan, and in the section 3, introduce the related prior researches. Moreover, in the section 4, the method and the result of our empirical research are shown. Finally, in conclusion, we summarize the result of this research and refer to directionality and research tasks from now on.
Japan.
However, actually, it is well known that each director of a company doesn't choose representative director but each director is often a subordinate of representative director and appointed by him or her as a director. As a matter of fact, in the companies of our country, there have been a lot of internal promotion directors. (4) Therefore, a big question has been posed in the effectiveness of monitoring representative director's duties of a company by such directors.
Particularly, after the end of 1980s, the various Commercial Act (the existing Companies Act) revisions to be related have been performed from the need of prevention of recurrence of corporate scandal and reinforcement of company competitiveness. In this way, the interest in governance of company has increased and the introduction of outside director is a part of it. Outside director who is not a subordinate of representative director of a company is expected to have two roles. The first is the supervision of duties execution by representative director of a company and the second is the advice to representative director using the knowledge that cultivated out of a company.
Outside director was introduced by the Commercial Act revision of 2002 for the purpose of reinforcement of supervision function. In addition, by the revision in 2014, the requirements for qualification of outside director under the Act became strict. For instance, now, a member of operating officer's close relatives of a company, operating officer of the parent company, and operating officer of the fellow subsidiaries can not become outside director of a company( Article 2（XV）of the Companies Act). The aim is that investment in Japanese companies is promoted and as a result it contributes to the growth of Japan's economy by increasing the trust of internal and external investors for Japanese companies. About the introduction of outside director by Companies Act of Japan, it is not the complete imposition. When a company do not introduce an outside director or more, the company has to explain the reason why it doesn't introduce outside director in stockholders' general meeting (Article 327-2 of the Act, comply or explain).
Meanwhile, in the Tokyo Stock Exchange, it is prescribed that a listed company has to select "an independent officer" or more as a matter which a companies must comply from the viewpoint of general stockholders protection.
Independent officer mentioned here is outside director or auditor who has no risk of having conflicts of interests with ordinary stockholders. (the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Securities Listings Regulations, Article 436-2).
It was introduced in 2010. The requirement of this independent officer obliged to be selected more than one independent officer is severer than Companies Act of Japan. Furthermore, the following person doesn't satisfy the requirements for qualification of independent officer: the person who was an executive officer of main business partner of a company,: the person who belonged to consultant, accountant, or legal profession (only group such a corporation) and got a large amount of money form it other than executive compensation from a company in the past (the Ordinance for Enforcement of the securities Listings regulations, Article 415(6)).
In addition, "Corporate Governance Cord" (Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2015) was formulated in response to the " Reviving Japan Strategy, JAPAN is BACK " revision in 2014. In the Code, the principles are showed that in a listed company at least two independent "directors" or more should be selected and they have to put constant distance with execution of business and have to have a role and duty to achieve highly effective supervision (monitoring) of executive officers from the independent objective viewpoint ( principle 4-8, comply or explain ).
It may be said that the formulation of the Financial Services Agency of Japan (2014) for Japan also contributes to the reinforcement of governance of a company in a broad sense. The principles that institutional investors should have responsibility are declared in it, for instance, reinforcement of monitoring portfolio companies by institutional investors (principle 3). The Financial Services Agency of Japanese government is going to expand the introduction of the code to many institutional investors by periodical announcement of the cord introduction.
In the companies of our country, there have been relatively few outside directors and many inside directors.
Director is a very important member of board of directors making decision in a company (Article 362(1) of the Companies Act). The pressure of introduction of outside director from foreign investors is high. In addition, there is the argument to doubt positive effect of outside director. Considering these matters, in governance reform of our country, it seems to be a matter of course that the introduction of outside director attracts big attention and has been discussed intensely.
PRIOR RESEARCHES
Does the introduction of outside director affect the increase of corporate value? There are a lot of researches that tried to confirm it in Japan and overseas. For example, Miwa (2010) (2) The influence that the increase of ratio of outside directors (or outside director who has high independency) to board of directors gives to increase probability of ratio of current price to book value of assets (or ROA) of companies. As a result, he arrives at a conclusion that outside director defined in Companies Act of Japan is not more likely to contribute to the improvement of long-term corporate performance.
Irei and Noma (2008) president who is representative director, the introduction of outside director and outside auditor do not lead to high evaluation from stock markets promptly and particularly the independency of outside directors is important.
In the article of Nishikawa and Hase (2015) they divide companies listed on the First Section of the TSE into large sized companies and middle and small sized companies, using time series data and cross section data, and analyze the influence that outside directors give return on equity (ROE) of the companies. As a result, if we look at the big picture of the market, the introduction of outside directors has a positive effect for their stock prices performance or the other performance. They note that in the case of large sized companies, the relationship between outside directors and stock prices or their performance may not be clear compared to middle and small sized companies. In addition, they think that the introduction effect of outside directors varies according to characteristics of companies, taking the other study Miyajima and Ogawa (2012) into account.
Miyajima and Ogawa (2012) companies' performance is confirmed definitely in low information acquisition cost company group, whereas they rather can confirm a negative effect of new selection of outside directors and high outside director ratio for the performance in high information acquisition cost company group. They claim these as a result of their empirical analysis. Information acquisition cost as is defined here is the degree to which outside directors can easily understand the contents of business of a company.
The influence of the introduction of outside director on performance of Japanese companies still remains controversial. This research reached one conclusion by introducing a new viewpoint.
METHODS SECTION

Analysis
We test the effect of outside directors on performance by using the empirical models applied in many accounting researches. Our models for this research are derived from the following simple regression models.
In these models, dependent and independent variables are defined by in the following way. ROA is operating income divided by total assets. is net income divided by common equity. We will describe these definitions above. The estimates of slope parameters (i.e. ̂ ̂ ) indicate performance persistence in consecutive two periods.
The estimates of intercept parameters (i.e. ̂ ̂ ) indicate short-term trend that unaffected by current profitability.
In order to determine the effect of outside directors on performance persistence, we incorporate binary information of outside directors into above models. We define variable by the ratio of numbers of outside directors divided by numbers of all directors i.e. in the board of directors. Dummy variable equals one if a firm's ratio of outside director are higher than average ratio for all firms in the same year and zero if otherwise.
is unity if ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ , zero otherwise.
We add this dummy variable to the estimate model for allowing different intercept and slope.
In testing the above explained hypothesis, we examine the statistically significance of intercept and slope coefficients, especially from equation (3) and (4). Statistical significance of intercept coefficient and means that the improvement of monitoring by outside directors drives high performance with no relation to current profitability. On the other hand, significance of slope coefficient and means that the improvement of monitoring by outside directors induces high persistence of current profitability.
And, in order to determine the effect of outside directors in critical situations, we incorporate information of critical situation into above models.
In above equations, dummy variables are defined by the following.
Equation (5); is unity if is positive and is positive, zero otherwise.
is unity if is negative and is negative, zero otherwise.
is unity if is positive and is negative, zero otherwise.
Equation (6);
is unity if is positive and is positive, zero otherwise.
In testing the above explained hypothesis, we examine the statistically significance of intercept and slope coefficients. The statistical significance of intercept coefficients , , ,and means that improvement of monitoring by outside directors causes higher performance with no relation to current profitability. Especially, the significance of coefficients and means that firm performance is improved by high level of outside director's monitoring in a critical situation. On the other hand, the statistical significance of slope coefficients , , ,and means that the improvement of monitoring by outside directors causes higher persistence of current profitability.
Especially, the significance of coefficients and means that firm performance is corrected by outside director's monitoring in a critical situation.
Measures
We measure performance of a firm by two financial ratios. The first ratio is ROA, which is operating income ( ) divided by average total assets ( ). The average total assets are defined by average of the beginning value ( ) and the ending value ( ).
Secondly ROE is other ratio, which is net income ( ) divided by average common equity ( ).As the average total assets ( ), the average common equity is defined by average of the beginning value ( ) and the ending value ( ).
These two ratios evaluate efficiency and profitability of a company. Especially, ROA measures performance of operation in using all assets (i.e. sum of debt and capital) to generate earnings. On the other hand, ROE measures performance in using capital provided by common shareholders to generate earnings.
Improvement of monitoring by outside directors is measured by ratio of outside directors on board of directors.
An outside director has the limited ability of monitoring inside directors. Proportion of outside directors to inside directors is important in terms of monitoring by outside directors. Therefore we use ratio of numbers of outside directors divided by numbers of all directors. We express symbolically this ratio in .
In above equation, Numerator is number of outside directors in company . Denominator is number of directors in firm . Therefore we measure improvement of monitoring by outside directors by .
Data and Sample
Our data used for this research are from Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System Table.1 and Table. 2 show the characteristics of Japanese companies which fulfill the first criterion. Especially, In 2003, average almost 5 percent on companies listed on TSE appoint outside directors, the ratio of companies with independent directors is 0.227. In 2014, 1877 companies appoint outside directors, its ratio is 0.733. Table.1 indicates that the number of companies with outside directors gradually increases. As shown in Table. 3, our sample, which fulfill all criteria, has a characteristic of composition ratio. In 2003, 999
Sample Characteristics
companies of sample are listed on the first section, 245 companies of sample are listed on the second section. The proportion of the second section companies is significantly lower than the proportion of the first section companies.
In 2014, 1187 companies of the sample are listed on the first section, 282 companies of the sample are listed on the second section. 
RESULTS
Table5 reports the results of the regression analyses that explore the effects of outside directors upon profit ratio's persistence. The column (1) shows the result of model 1 estimating ROA's persistence. The coefficient of current ROA ( ) is positive value and statistical significant at 1% level. The interpretation of coefficient 0.752 means that almost 75 percentages of current ROA persist to the following year. As the Column (1), the column (2) shows the result of model 2 estimating ROE's persistence. The coefficient of current ROE ( ) is positive value and statistical significant at 1% level. The estimate of coefficient means that almost 39 percentages of current ROE persist to the following year.
The Column (3) shows the result of model 3 estimating the effect outside director on ROA's persistence. As previously described, this model estimates the effect of outside director in all situations. The estimate of is negative value and statistical significant at only 10% level. On the other hand, the estimate of is positive value and statistical significant at only 10% level. The interpretation of these results is quite difficult and complexity.
Same as the Column (3) Additional Notes*: 10%Level statistical significant, **:5%Level statistical significant, ***:1%Level statistical significant
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The goal of this article was twofold. The first was to estimate the effect of corporate governance reinforcement on profitability of companies. The second was to estimate the effect of corporate governance reinforcement with regard to critical situation. Several important conclusions are derived from the findings in this research. When we estimate the effects of corporate governance reinforcement with disregard to the profit situations of companies, the research did not provide the statistically significant effect of corporate governance reinforcement on performance persistence. That is to say, we were not able to confirm positive effects of corporate governance reinforcement on profitability of companies. However, when companies are in critical situations (ROA <0), governance reinforcement got a result to have some positive effect for recovery of the profitability. This differential impact among these situations can be explained by the limitation of outside directors on corporate governance. Like all studies, our research contains some notable limitations. Company performance was measured as ROA and ROE. The level of these persistence measures the effect of corporate governance reinforcement on profitability of companies. Many other financial and non-financial measurements can be used as Company performance, while these ratios were used commonly by the financial statement analysis. Corporate governance reinforcement of outside directors was measured as binary variable. This binary variable equals one if a firm's ratio of outside director are higher than average ratio for all firms in the same year and zero if otherwise. Many other discrete and continue variables can be used as corporate governance reinforcement. Future studies can explore some of the issues identified in this research using other measurement of company performance and corporate governance reinforcement. These results also speak to importance of understanding the effect of outside directors on corporate profitability and these
